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Managing major risks creates problems for governments when probabilities are hard to estimate and
outcomes are uncertain. Reviewing the experience of the 2009 swine flu pandemic fear, Adam Oliver
argues that the UK government over-reacted in some key respects. Partly underlying this response was an
‘aversion to ambiguity’ pattern of behaviour that has long been studied by social scientists. Ambiguity
aversion  led to an under appreciation by ministers of the opportunity costs of acting, resulting in the
government prolonging an insufficiently targeted use of antivirals, and the purchasing of more flu vaccine
than was necessary, at an additional cost of perhaps £500 million.
In the spring of 2009, the UK government claimed that the country was well prepared to respond to the
global swine flu outbreak. The response was based upon a feared outbreak of avian flu. Swine flu ultimately
proved milder and less deadly that a worst case avian flu outbreak, which has led some to conclude that the
government overreacted to the 2009 threat. One possible explanation for an excessive response from the
government is given by ambiguity (or ‘uncertainty’) aversion. That is, the behaviour of the swine flu virus was
unknown, and thus the government attached disproportionate weight to the worst possible outcome of the
threat. A dislike of ambiguity, or ambiguity aversion, implies that people will pay a high price to avoid it, or,
when it cannot be avoided, they adopt a pessimistic approach and overweight the slight possibility of the
worst outcome occurring.
The potential drivers of the government’s
strong response were manyfold. For example,
Sir Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer
for England at the time, had for many years
invested much effort in highlighting the threat of
pandemics. Moreover, the initial information
from Mexico appeared to suggest that the virus
was associated with rapid spread and high
fatality. In parallel, the modellers that the
government relied on to predict the outcome of
the 2009 outbreak relied on parameters that
reflected more accurately the greater severity
of the avian flu outbreak, and fears provoked
by previous pandemics had a significant
influence on the government. For instance, the
Asian flu and Hong Kong flu outbreaks in 1957
and 1968-69, respectively, had each killed 1-4
million people, and the Spanish flu outbreak of
1918-19 is estimated to have killed up to 40
million people worldwide.
Between 27 April and 2 July 2009, the government focused upon a swine flu containment strategy, the focal
point of which centred on the use of antiviral medications. The government implemented a policy of
recommending antiviral use by those who had come into contact with anyone infected with the virus, in the
hope that this would slow the spread and thus give more time to learn about the virus’ characteristics before
it had spread extensively throughout the population. The English government adopted a ‘treat all’ approach
with respect to antivirals, meaning that all those with swine flu symptoms were advised to take the
medications. However, by mid May the Health Protection Agency recommended that the use of antivirals be
reduced, due to the observed side of effects of the medications, the large number of people who were not
completing the courses of the drugs, and the risk of causing drug resistance. The English government did
not change its policy until the beginning of July, and thus its actions regarding the use of antivirals can
reasonably be viewed as excessive. However, in this case, any excessive reaction is perhaps less likely to
have been motivated by ambiguity aversion per se; rather, the principal motivation may well have been to
maintain public confidence.
Losing public confidence is a possible opportunity cost of not acting aggressively, but there are also
opportunity costs of acting too aggressively that the government may have insufficiently considered. Initially,
the reasonable worst case scenario specified up to 65,000 deaths, intended for planning purposes, but used
by some in the media as a prediction. This may have incited a degree of fear within the population. Aside
from the disutility felt from personal anxiety, fear can lead to attention and resources being directed away
from interventions that are potentially more health-enhancing and life-saving. In an independent review of
the government’s swine flu policy (the Hine Review), it was estimated that the response consumed £1.2
billion in direct costs. If a part of this spending could have been avoided with a more measured response, it
could have been used to significant effect elsewhere. On the flipside of provoking short term fear is the
danger of desensitising people to risk in the longer term. That is, in the longer term, the government could
face accusations of ‘crying wolf’.
By 2 July 2009, the government moved onto a treatment strategy, and focused on more targeted antiviral
use. However, the stand-out feature of the treatment phase was the development and later use of a swine flu
vaccine. In the Spring of 2009, Ministers had to choose between buying 30 million doses and 132 million
doses of the vaccine, with the latter being sufficient to vaccinate the whole population effectively. The
decision to purchase 132 million doses was confirmed on 17 June. This quantity of vaccine was ultimately not
required. It took until 21 October before the vaccine was developed and cleared to administer, almost six
months since the first UK cases of illness had been recorded on 27 April. The process could not have been
significantly quicker. It has been estimated by some experts that a worst case pandemic would largely be
over within four months of the first cases being recorded, which raises the question of whether a vaccine is
likely to negate an outbreak significantly.
The government announced that high risk groups would initially be targeted for vaccination. These included
those aged between six months and sixty-five years with low immunities or certain chronic illnesses, pregnant
women, the non-healthy over sixty-fives, and frontline health care workers; in total, 13 million people. The
government anticipated that 75 per cent of these would choose to be vaccinated. However, only 5.5 million
people in total vaccinated themselves against the virus. Although it is likely that more people would have
vaccinated themselves had the full threat been realised, the government would have been well advised of
the likelihood that a significant percentage of the population would not have done so. The government thus
purchased sufficient vaccine for a worst case scenario, which appears to lend itself to ambiguity aversion,
but even if the worst case is certain to happen, a policy of purchasing vaccine for the whole population is
questionable. By the time the vaccine is ready, the peak of the pandemic is likely to be over, many will have
natural immunity, and a great number will not in any case vaccinate themselves.
To conclude, most of us are ambiguity averse. We will think of the opportunity costs of not acting, and be
influenced by a ‘what if’ effect. Erring on the side of caution in such cases feeds into a basic human need for
security. However, at the policy making level, it ought to be recognized that in addition to the opportunity
costs of not acting (e.g. the potential political costs, the possible loss of public confidence, the loss of life if
the worst happens), there are opportunity costs of acting (e.g. provoking unnecessary fear, the
repercussions from ‘crying wolf’, the lives and health lost by diverting resources away from other services)
that should not be overlooked. The contention here is that, in part due to an aversion to ambiguity, the
government in England overlooked to some extent the opportunity costs of acting, which led them to prolong
an insufficiently targeted use of antivirals, and to purchase more vaccine than they ought to have done.
This is a synopsis of a seminar for policy-makers and academics from many disciplines  held at the LSE on
Wednesday October 13. Click here to download a PDF version of Adam Oliver’s draft paper.
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